Full Faith and Credit
As the drafters of the U.S. Constitution considered the ways in which the individual states might be bound into a more homogenous nation, they needed to look no further than their own midst to see the problems involved in such an undertaking. Each delegate's home state, under the Articles of Confederation, featured a different economic system, as well as its own courts and conflicting laws. How would it be possible to mold all these divergent perspectives into a nation with a sense of unity?
A key component of this process was embodied in Sections 1 and 2 of Article IV of the Constitution. In its simplest sense, these provisions give the acts and judicial decisions of a state -- as well as the rights of its citizens -- full and valid recognition by all other states within the Union.
The first portion of Article IV, that dealing with acts of the various states, has been particularly applicable to judicial decisions. One of the earliest court tests establishing the parameters of this section of the Constitution came in the 1813 case of Mills v. Duryee. In an action brought in the circuit court of the District Columbia -- the equivalent of a state court for this purpose -- on a judgment from a New York court, the defendant attempted to reopen the whole question of the merits of the original case. The claim was answered through the words of the first implementing statute of 1790, which echoed the Constitution's demand that such records and proceedings were entitled in each state to the same "faith and credit" as in the state of origin.
In addition, the court ruled that because the records of the case were official records of a New York court, and so conclusive of the merits of the case there, they were equally so elsewhere.
This portion of the Constitution also allows a citizen of one state to travel freely in another state, enjoying the same privileges and immunities as the citizens of that state. The rights granted to a person via state citizenship are applicable throughout the Union, without regard to the crossing of state lines.
The Supreme Court, in the 1823 case of Corfield v. Coryell, attempted to define these basic rights when it said: "What these fundamental principles are . . . may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: protection by the Government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject nevertheless to such restraints as the Government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole; the right of a citizen of one State to pass through, or to reside in any other State . . . to claim the benefit of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the State; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the State; . . . the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the State in which it is to be exercised."
The community of rights among the citizens of all the states has its origin in colonial days, when the residents of this nation were all subjects of the same British monarch. After the Declaration of Independence was signed, questions arose as to how to reconcile the advantages of a common citizenship with a dispersed sovereignty.
In the Slaughter-House Cases (1873), Justice Samuel F. Miller wrote that the sole purpose of this clause of the Constitution was "to declare to the several States, that whatever these rights, as you grant or establish them to your own citizens, or as you limit or qualify, or impose restrictions on their exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other States within your jurisdiction."
Enforcement of this clause is dependent upon the judicial process -- a determination made both through constitutional law and common practice. The Constitution does not authorize action by Congress to uphold this clause. Indeed, federal statutes prohibiting conspiracies to deprive any person of rights or privileges secured by state laws, or punishing infractions by individuals of the rights of citizens to reside peacefully in a state, and to have free ingress into and egress from it, have been consistently held void by the courts.
Still, there is one segment of society which does not enjoy this constitutional right to freedom of movement in another state -- those who have committed a crime and have fled into that state to escape justice. The Constitution specifically gives the governor of each state the authority to turn over fugitives from justice living in that state when the governor of the state in which the crime was committed requests it. This process is called "extradition." American history finds the first use of this process in the provisions of the New England Confederation, an early attempt at union by Massachusetts, Bay Colony, Plymouth, New Haven and Connecticut.
To be a fugitive from justice under this clause of the Constitution, it is not necessary that the party should have left the state after an indictment, or for the purpose of avoiding a prosecution either anticipated or begun. It is sufficient that the person, having committed a crime within one state and having left that jurisdiction before being subjected to criminal process, is found within another state. The motive which led him to depart is immaterial.
However, only after a person has been formally charged with a crime in the regular course of judicial proceedings may the governor of the state in which the crime was committed request extradition from another state.
The duty of a governor to surrender a fugitive is not absolute nor is it unqualified. No court, for example, can force a governor to surrender a fugitive to another state, and governors on occasion have refused to do so.
Similarly, the original language of the Constitution also provided for the return of fugitive slaves. With the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery, this portion of Article IV, Section 2 became obsolete.
The protection of one state's judicial records, acts and citizens from arbitrary abuse by another state was considered to be a crucial step in attempting to unite the various state governments. In retrospect, it has served its purpose well, giving legitimacy and respect to the practices and citizens of all the states. It was a key effort in the building of a nation not of conflicting practices and viewpoints, but one with common purposes.