Freedom of Assembly
Freedom of assembly -- the right of people to gather without fear of government harassment or intrusion -- is inextricably tied to freedom of speech, of religion, and to petition the government, rights also encompassed within the First Amendment.
Indeed, the ties between these rights can be easily demonstrated. People who share particular religious beliefs congregate to worship; without freedom of assembly such gatherings might be challenged, and religious liberty thus severely limited. Those who exercise their religious liberty often do so by addressing large audiences. Were not people free to assemble to hear another's views, freedom of speech would be reduced to a mere right to hold personal conversations on controversial topics. Further, those who seek to petition the government may attempt to form a movement, gathering people at rallies and meetings. If such assemblies were prohibited, efforts to petition the government might fail through want of sufficient members to call attention to the issue.
The right of assembly, guaranteed in the First Amendment, is echoed in the Missouri Constitution, which declares, "That the people have the right peaceably to assemble for their common good . . ." This written commitment to freedom of assembly has its origins in English law of centuries ago.
Although a specific guarantee of the freedom of English subjects to assemble is conspicuously absent from those documents which declared the rights of Englishmen -the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right and the English Bill of Rights -- Englishmen often assembled to discuss their grievances with the monarch. They did so at their own risk, however, because any such gathering was subject to suppression if the monarchy felt the assembly imposed an undue threat to the crown.
Indeed, royal interference with the assemblage of Englishmen was most notable in efforts to deter the spread of religious groups which opposed the Church of England, either by doctrine or by their very existence. Unaccepted religious groups and sects were prohibited from using any buildings for meetings or ceremonies of worship. When English subjects made an attempt to effect parliamentary reform, a law was placed on the books which declared that no public meeting of more than 50 persons would be held to petition the king, except in the presence of a magistrate with the authority to arrest everyone present. The English subjects had little choice in the matter: the penalty for resisting the magistrate was death.
The Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights, adopted in 1776, embodies the first written assurance in America of a people's right to assemble: "That the people have a right to assemble together, to consult for their common good."
Thus, when a committee of the House of Representatives was considering possible amendments to the U. S. Constitution, a written guarantee of the right of the people to assemble was one of the basic proposals submitted by James Madison. Despite the soundness of this proposal, many members of the committee were opposed to the inclusion of such a provision. That opposition was not based upon a disagreement with the idea, but rather with a belief that such a written guarantee was unnecessary. One Massachusetts delegate adamantly opposed the proposal, questioning:
"Shall we secure the freedom of speech, and think it necessary, at the same time, to allow the right of assembly? If people converse freely, they must assemble for that purpose; it is a self-evident, unalienable right which the people possess . . . it is derogatory to the dignity of the house to descend to such minutiae."
Despite such pleas, the majority of the members, perhaps mindful of the examples evident throughout recent English history, were not persuaded. Their position on the issue was eloquently summarized by another Massachusetts delegate, who argued:
"The people ought to be secure in the peaceable enjoyment of this privilege, and that can only be done by making a declaration to that effect in the Constitution."
The key word here is "secure." Without a written constitutional guarantee of this freedom, making it a legal right, there could be no assurance that it would not, at some time, be undermined. It is the legal nature of freedom of assembly which insures that it will not be abridged by the government.
The only other point of contention in the debate over freedom of assembly among our forefathers was whether to insert the phrase "to instruct their representatives" after the word "assemble." Our early leaders wisely avoided this limitation on the freedom, realizing that it could provide a possible means to repress certain gatherings of citizens.
In the 200 years since our founders inserted the constitutional provision guaranteeing freedom of assembly, it has been the duty of the nation's courts to interpret the exact meaning of the clause. The main doctrine formulated by the courts is the "clear and present danger" rule. Although those who assemble to present their opinions may espouse unorthodox proposals, the seemingly peculiar nature of their views may not be used as an excuse for governmental interference with their rights, unless the gathering poses a "clear and present danger" to public safety.
A representative case involves the freedom marches and picketing demonstrations which were characteristic of the civil rights movement of the 1960s. The case, Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, Alabama, involved incidents which occurred on the afternoon of April 12, 1963. Some 52 black people were led out of a Birmingham church by three black ministers, one of whom was Fred Shuttlesworth. The marchers walked in orderly fashion, two abreast, for four blocks to protest the alleged denial of civil rights to blacks in Birmingham. The marchers stayed on the sidewalks, except at street intersections, and did not interfere with other pedestrians or automobile traffic. Despite this, the marchers were arrested at the end of four blocks.
The U. S. Supreme Court, in deciding the case in 1969, overturned Shuttlesworth's conviction, holding that his constitutional right to peaceably assemble had been violated under the guise of a city ordinance for the regulation of parades. Although granting that the city has an interest in preventing interference with the flow of pedestrians and traffic, the court noted that no threat to public safety had been created by the group.
In an earlier case, the Supreme Court held that a corollary to the freedom of assembly is the freedom of association. In that ruling, NAACP v. Alabama, the court held that governments may not adopt policies which are designed overtly or covertly to discourage citizens from joining groups which the government may believe to be undesirable. The ruling stemmed from an attempt by the State of Alabama to force the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to reveal the names and addresses of all its members in the state.
The courts have thus held that government's desire to hinder the formation and assemblage of groups which it deems unsuitable is not sufficient cause to override an individual's constitutional right to associate with whomever he so desires. That right, guaranteed in writing by our farsighted early leaders some 200 years ago, will continue to be a bulwark on the side of those who wish to make their own choices as individuals rather than submit to government control of their lives.