Defamation and the Public Official
On March 29, 1960, a full-page advertisement, entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices," was carried in the New York Times. The advertisement began by noting the non-violent demonstrations in which black students in the southern United States were participating. The ad went on to accuse police in Montgomery, Alabama, and state authorities of harassing the students and engaging in an "unprecedented wave of terror."
The commissioner of public affairs for the city of Montgomery, who supervised the city's police department, filed suit against the newspaper and four black clergymen whose names had appeared at the end of the advertisement as endorsers. In his suit, he claimed that the statements made in the ad would be read as referring to him in his role as supervisor of the police forces. An Alabama jury agreed, awarding $500 in damages to the plaintiff. This judgment was later affirmed by the Alabama Supreme Court.
Thus the stage was set for one of the most important cases ever to be decided by the U. S. Supreme Court. The case, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, forced the nation's highest court to decide whether or not the rule of civil liability for defamation of a public official, as applied by the state court, was constitutionally objectionable as a result of its failure to provide the defendants with the defense of conditional privilege.
The court ruled that constitutional guarantees prohibit a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice. Actual malice was defined as (1) knowledge of falsity, or (2) reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of the statement. The court thereby ruled that a conditional privilege and the allowance of the defense of truth required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments applied.
The effect of this landmark case was the recognition of a qualified privilege under the U. S. Constitution to criticize public officials and candidates without liability for defamation. However, the court failed to outline the definition of "public official." What individuals were to be included in the term?
The Supreme Court later had the opportunity to clarify that point in its ruling in Rosenblatt v. Baer. Here the court stated, "The term public official applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs." It also indicated that the public official must occupy a position that would invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it.
In the Sullivan and Rosenblatt cases, the Supreme Court once again walked the fine but discernible line between the public official and the private citizen engaged in open discussion. The First Amendment was adopted in order to preserve the open discussion by the public of all political issues, including public officials. To allow a public official to recover every time someone made a statement that was not completely true would result in self-censorship of the press and the public discussion of these officials.
Another area that has drawn questioning in recent years is the area of public figures in the news. These are people who are not public officials, yet draw much public interest and attention. A case called Time Inc. v. Hill is a leading case in this area. Here Hill sued Time Inc., alleging that Life magazine falsely reported that a new play portrayed an experience suffered by the plaintiff and his family. Hill claimed that the Life article was intended to, and did, give the impression that the play mirrored the experiences of the Hill family, which, as Life was aware, was false and untrue. Life's defense was that the article was a subject of legitimate news interest, general interest, value and concern to the public at the time of publication, and that it was published in good faith without any malice. The jury disagreed with Life's contentions, awarding a sizable sum to Hill.
The U. S. Supreme Court reversed the decision, ruling that the First Amendment did not allow Hill to recover for invasion of privacy. The background of the decision stemmed from the general recognition in common law of two closely related and perhaps identical privileges, both founded upon the basic idea of freedom of the press. One was the privilege of giving further publicity to already public figures; the other was that of giving publicity to news and other matters of public interest.
A public figure is one who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs and his character, has become a public personage. He is a celebrity. This would include, of course, those who have achieved a reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of the baseball player, actor, fighter or entertainer. Also included are public officers, inventors, explorers, war heroes, soldiers or anyone who has arrived at a position where public attention is focused upon him as a person.
These people have been held to have lost, to some degree, their right to privacy. In most of the cases, courts have given three reasons for this forfeiture of a portion of the right of privacy: (1) that they had sought publicity and consented to it; (2) that their personalities and affairs had already become public, and could not be regarded as their own private business anymore; and (3) that the press has a privilege under the Constitution to inform the public about those who have become legitimate figures of public interest.
Whether a person is a public official or public figure, the fact is that he has lost, at least to a degree, the right of privacy that most people enjoy. Such a concession, the courts have ruled, is necessary to insure that open discussion, as promised under the free speech and free press provisions of the First Amendment, continues without hindrance.